October 13, 2002 - From: Dr Winford James
trinicenter.com

Election Postmortem

The most dramatic (and popular) result of Election 2002 is the breaking of the nine-month 18-18 deadlock of the parliamentary process where the PNM governed without the acceptance of the UNC and where the latter opposed from outside of parliament by mostly making insistent and strident demands for a fresh election. The PNM held its 18 seats but took away two of the UNC's to have a four-seat majority in a parliament which can now function. It did so on a basis that included Afro solidarity, PNM incumbency, and a high voter turnout. Out of government, the UNC stays there on the backlash of its corruption and despite the abiding solidarity of its Indo constituency. But with the deadlock broken, there are issues that arise, some of them re-arising.

The most important of them is the old one of constitutional reform. Eighteen-eighteen energised the issue in our minds in unprecedented ways, but failed to give it institutional reality. The political leaders simply lacked the courage and will to come together and jointly take steps for meaningful inclusion of our major ethnic constituencies (Tobago, Afro Trinidad, Indo Trinidad, and French Creole Trinidad) in the executive and legislative arms of government. That was too risky; it was far more convenient for either Afro or Indo Trinidad to win government by going past the post first. Well, the PNM crossed first and has promised the reform on broad-based community consultation, but with a fairly comfortable majority, with glorious economic prospects in its current incumbency, and with the pleasant weight of selfish tradition, there may not be the urgency that 18-18 revealed. (It's always the government to take the initiative, isn't it?)

A second important issue is the strengthening of PNM resolve to keep the UNC out of power given the financial recklessness and vulgarity of the UNC years. One PNM mantra now is 'Keep them fellas far from the treasury! They too tief!' The issue subsumes major issues like anti-corruption legislation, greater accommodation of Tobago, greater distribution of Indos in the cabinet, and more rational provision of care to long-suffering Afro Trinidad. Breaking up an ethnic monolith is exceedingly difficult, but the PNM will be hoping that a pursuit of those issues will make the monolith haemorrhage and leak sufficiently to keep them in power.

Tobago accommodation is a special issue that re-arises. If Tobago receives unprecedented accommodation, what will happen to the Tobago NAR? PNM held Tobago at one time but lost its hold through administrative spite, Trinidadian patronisation, abysmal Trinidadian under-appreciation of Tobagonian aspirations, and PNM lack of political growth and creativity. But certain socio-political developments have catapulted PNM back into control, not the least of which are Hochoy Charles' maximum leadership style and associated excessive self-importance (in both the party and the executive council) and the threatening Indo hegemony of the UNC regime. As things stand now, PNM have been hard put to win a majority in Trinidad (18 seats in 2002, 16 in 2001, 17 in 1995), and Manning seems to have realised that, with the Indo monolith in Trinidad, he has to keep the island's two seats by keeping Hochoy and the NAR out of power in Tobago. And what better way to do so but to treat the island as the special national component it is and 'deliver' more legislative, financial, and executive autonomy?

A fourth important issue is the fortunes of the UNC given its return to the opposition, Panday's old age (70), and the absence of a clear successor. Panday has been an Indo (and not a national!) hero with a dynamic history, in a way no other person in the UNC hierarchy has been, and his inescapably imminent departure from the leadership is bound to leave a gaping vacuum. Will Panday keep the old fire to lead the party in opposition? Will his eventual successor command all the conditions of support that he has enjoyed? Will the inevitable infighting over the leadership (remember the Lawrence Maharaj debacle?) splinter the party (further)? Or will ethnic solidarity for government power cause a sacrifice of ambition? Will the new leader keep the non-Indos Panday attracted and attract others, especially now that fully fifteen of the 16 UNC heads in the lower house are Indo? (It will be interesting to see what the racial composition of the UNC senators will be, won't it?)

The PNM clearly has most of the political opportunities and advantages at this time. It is in government, in control of the executive and the legislature. It controls the treasury. Incumbency will enable it to more readily reach out to both supporters and non-supporters. And it could take a vigorous initiative on constitutional reform. One of the biggest questions, though, is: Is it bold enough to move toward automatic ethnic inclusiveness in the governance of the nation?


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